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A simple model of potential outcomes
Simple binary treatment 0/1 for untreated (or treatment 0)
and treated (or treatment 1), respectively
di represents the treatment status of individual i
Each individual has two counterfactual outcomes, y0i /y
1
i ,
depending on treatment status
We deﬁne
y0i = β +ui
y1i = β +αi +ui
The observed outcome of individual i is yi
yi = y
0
i +di
(
y1i − y0i
)
= β +diαi +ui
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The treatment eﬀect
Wish to assess impact of treatment relative to no treatment
on the outcome y
For individual i this is αi = y1i − y0i : individual level causal
eﬀect
Missing data problem: the treatment eﬀect (αi ) or the two
potential outcomes
(
y0i ,y
1
i
)
cannot be directly measured for
any individual
We can hope to identify some features of the distribution of
treatment eﬀects, but not the individual treatment eﬀect
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Identiﬁcation issues
Two main diﬃculties faced by evaluation studies
1 The treatment eﬀect, αi , is heterogeneous
2 Selection into treatment may depend on both counterfactual
outcomes,
(
y0i ,y
1
i
)
, and thus on the gain from treatment, αi
Evaluation methods tend to be designed to identify some
feature of the distribution of αi
We will start by focusing on the ATT but will then move to
other moments of the distribution of the treatment eﬀect
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Identiﬁcation issues
Illustration: Ordinary Least Squares
Consider an iid sample {(yi ,di )}i=1,...,N and the linear regression
yi = β +αdi + ei . The OLS estimator of α is
αˆOLS =
1
N ∑i yidi − 1N2 ∑i yi ∑di
1
N ∑i d
2
i −
(
1
N ∑di
)2
which identiﬁes the parameter
αOLS = E [αi |di = 1]+E
[
y0i |di = 0
]−E [y0i |di = 1]
Heterogeneity: the ﬁrst term is ATT = E
[
y1i |di = 1
]−E [y0i |di = 1]
Selection bias: the second term suggests treated and untreated are
diﬀerent
Selection on the unobservables: conditioning on observables X may
not change this result
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Instrumental Variables
Motivation
IV directly addresses the problem of selection on the
unobservables
Selection creates compositional diﬀerences between treated
and untreated
IV solution: ﬁnd variable(s) Z aﬀecting selection but not
outcomes
Changes in Z induce changes in treatment status without
aﬀecting outcomes
Under certain conditions, variation in Z can be used to
compare otherwise identical individuals and identify the
treatment eﬀect
Z are the exogenous instruments
Similar to a natural experiment: ﬁnd an event (z = 0,1) that
assigns individuals to treatment randomly
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The model
Omit observed variables: assume alignment of observed
covariates
Consider single instrument z for simplicity
The selection model of outcomes is
yi = β +αidi +ui
= β +αd +[ui +di (αi −α)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ei
di = 1 [g(zi ,vi )> 0]
Selection on the unobservables: (e,v) are related:(α,v)
and/or (α,v) not independent
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Classical instrumental variables
Homogeneous treatment eﬀects
The outcome equation simpliﬁes to
yi = β +αdi +ui
If z unrelated to y other then through d
E(yi | zi = z) = β +αP(di = 1 | z)+E(ui | z)
= β +αP(z)
Choose z∗ and z∗∗ such that P(di = 1 | z∗) 6= P(di = 1 | z∗∗) and contrast
the 2 groups
E(yi | z∗)−E(yi | z∗∗) = α [P(z∗)−P(z∗∗)] implying α IV = E(yi |z
∗)−E(yi |z∗∗)
P(z∗)−P(z∗∗) = α
If z continuous it is more eﬃcient to use all its variation
cov(y ,z) = αcov(d ,z)+cov(u,z) implying α IV = cov(y ,z)
cov(d ,z)
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Classical instrumental variables
Identiﬁcation assumptions
Identiﬁcation hinges on 3 assumptions
1 Homogeneity: αi = α for all i
2 z determines participation: P(di = 1 | z∗) 6= P(di = 1 | z∗∗) (or g
is a non-trivial function of z)
3 Exclusion: E (u|z) = E (u)
When are these assumptions violated?
returns from treatment unlikely to be homogeneous
weak instruments - if z has insuﬃcient variation or is weakly
related to d −→ imprecise estimates of α
may be diﬃcult to ﬁnd data on a variable that does not aﬀect
simultaneously d and y
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Classical instrumental variables
Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects
The general model of outcomes is
yi = β +αd+[ui +di (αi −α)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ei
Classical IV now identiﬁes
α IV = α+
E (ei | z∗)−E (ei | z∗∗)
P (z∗)−P (z∗∗)
unless the IV condition E(yi | zi = z) = β +αp(z) still holds, meaning
E(ei | zi = z) = E(ui | zi = z)+P(di = 1 | z)E(αi −α | di = 1,zi = z)
= 0
In particular, the IV condition requires individuals not to have, or not to act
upon, information about their own idiosyncratic gains
Violation of the classical IV condition means z aﬀects outcomes through ways
other than d
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The Local Average Treatment Eﬀect
Homogeneity (or ignorance) is not compelling: individuals expected
to use more and better information about their own potential
outcomes then can be observed
Under an additional assumption, Imbens and Angrist (1994,
Econometrica) oﬀer an interpretation to the IV estimator: LATE
Suppose there exists a variable z capable of inducing individuals to
change treatment status for reasons unrelated to potential outcomes
Imagine having data on 2 groups with diﬀerent realisations of z but
otherwise similar
Observed diﬀerences in mean outcomes can then be attributed to
diﬀerences in participation rates due to z only
In special cases, such diﬀerences can be use to identify the impact
of treament on the subpopulation of compliers
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LATE: assumptions
Remember the model of outcomes
yi = β +αd +[ui +di (αi −α)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ei
Consider a binary instrument (z = 0/1) such as an exogenous policy
reform
Deﬁne the function diz as the treatment status of individual i under policy z :
diz = 1(g (z ,vi )> 0)
LATE requires stronger assumptions then classical IV to compensate for
the lack of homogeneity
1 z determines participation (g is a non-trivial function of z - IV2)
2 Exclusion: E(ui |z) = E(ui ) (IV3)
3 (α,v) are jointly independent of z
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LATE: identiﬁcation
Assumptions 2 and 3 impose
potential outcomes (y0,y1) are not aﬀected by the policy regime
z is exogenous in the participation equation
p (di = 1|zi = z) = P (g (z ,vi )> 0)
= P (diz = 1) = P (z)
And can be used to derive
E(yi |zi = z) = β +P (di = 1|z)E (αi |di = 1,z)
= β +P (diz = 1)E (αi |diz = 1)
Contrasting the policy regimes under additional assumption 1:
E(yi |zi = 1)−E(yi |zi = 0)
= P [di1−di0 = 1]E [αi | di1−di0 = 1]−P [di1−di0 =−1]E [αi | di1−di0 =−1]
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LATE: monotonicity
Contrasting the policy regimes under additional assumption 1:
E(yi |zi = 1)−E(yi |zi = 0)
= P [di1−di0 = 1]E [αi | di1−di0 = 1]−P [di1−di0 =−1]E [αi | di1−di0 =−1]
The above expression is useless unless
homogeneous eﬀects: E(yi |zi = 1)−E(yi |zi = 0) = P [di1 6= di0]E [αi ]
impose additional monotonicity assumption
Monotonicity: di0 > (6) di1 for all i (with strict inequality for some i)
This is to say that either P [di1−di0 = 1] = 0 or P [di1−di0 =−1] = 0,
but not both
Notice that an index restricion in the participation rule (meaning v is
additively separable) implies the monotoniciy assumption
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LATE: identiﬁcation
Suppose p [di1−di0 =−1] = 0
any (z = 0)-participant is also a (z = 1)-participant
Then
αLATE = E [αi | di1−di0 = 1]
=
E (yi |zi = 1)−E (yi |zi = 0)
P (zi = 1)−P (zi = 0)
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LATE: discussion
Local assumptions and local parameters
Controversy surrounding LATE
shows IV can be meaningless when eﬀects are heterogeneous
if monotonicity assumption justiﬁed, LATE can be an
interesting approach to compare two policy regimes
but in generally results are instrument-dependent and LATE
measures eﬀects on a not clearly deﬁned population
interpretation particularly cumbersome when z continuous
Monica Costa Dias, IFS Microeconometric Policy Evaluation
Marginal Treatment Eﬀects
Motivation
We have studied two diﬀerent parameters - ATT and LATE
both averages over parts of the distribution of treatment eﬀects
makes it diﬃcult to interpret and synthetise results
How they relate to each other is formalised by the Marginal
Treatment Eﬀect (MTE)
First introduced by Bjorklund and Moﬃt (1987) to quantify the
impact of treatment on individuals just indiﬀerent about
participation
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2006) use the MTE as a
unifying parameter in the treatment eﬀect literature
basis for deﬁnition of all other average treatment eﬀect parameters
and for their interpretation
They notice LATE can be measured for inﬁnitesimal changes in the
instrument z to form the MTE
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MTE: deﬁnition
Consider a continuous instrument, z
And the selection model of outcomes after imposing an index
restriction on the selection rule
yi = β +αd +[ui +di (αi −α)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ei
di = 1 [vi < g(zi )]
For a given value z
participants are those drawing vi < g(z)
the marginal (indiﬀerent) participant draws vi = g(z)
MTE: eﬀect on individuals drawing a speciﬁc value of v , say g (z)
E
(
y1i −y0i |vi = g(z)
)
= E (αi |vi = g(z) ) = αMTE (g (z))
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MTE: convenient representation
Assume we are under the LATE assumptions 1 to 3 together with
the index restriction
Let Fv be cdf of v and write
P(z) = P (vi < g(z))
= Fv (g(z))
Under the index restriction
vi < g(z) ⇔ Fv (vi )< Fv (g(z)) ⇔ v˜i < P(z)
where v˜ = Fv (v) follows a uniform [0,1] distribution
Now, for a given z and p = P(z):
a participant is someone drawing v˜i below p = P(z)
indiﬀerence regarding participation occurs at v˜i = p
MTE redeﬁned as the impact of treatment at a point p in the
distribution of ν˜
αMTE (p) = E(αi |v˜i = p)
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MTE: convenient representation
MTE independent of z since z contains no information on
expected gains after conditioning on v˜ (LATE assumptions)
αMTE (p) = E (α|v˜ = p,z) for any value z
Thus MTE is the average impact of treatment on individuals
drawing a speciﬁc value of v˜ , irrespective of z
But for those indiﬀerent at p - meaning z : v˜ = p = P(z)
αMTE (p) = E (α|v˜ = p,P (z) = p)
This expression justiﬁes the interpretation of MTE as the
impact of treatment on individuals at the margin of
participation
It also supports the identiﬁcation strategy using LIV
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MTE: Local IV
Under LATE assumptions 2 and 3 together with additive separability of v
E (yi |zi = z) = β +P (zi )E (αi |z ,di = 1)
= β +P (zi )E (αi |v˜i < P(z))
= E (yi |P (z))
Further imposing the ﬁrst LATE assumption and contrasting two poins in
the domain of z , say (z∗,z∗∗)
αLATE (z∗,z∗∗) =
E (y |z∗ )−E (y |z∗∗ )
P (z∗)−P (z∗∗)
=
E (y |P (z∗) )−E (y |P (z∗∗) )
P (z∗)−P (z∗∗)
Taking the limits as z∗ and z∗∗ become arbitrarily close
αLIV (P (z)) =
∂E (y |P (z) )
∂P (z)
LIV stands for Local IV - a formulation of the MTE parameter using
individuals at the margin of participation at P(z)
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MTE: estimation
The derivation of LIV suggests an estimation procedure for the
local MTE
1 estimate P(z) and compute the predicted values pˆ
2 regress y on P(z) non-parametrically - say using local
polynomials
3 diﬀerentiate with respect to P(z)
If z can induce variation in P(z) over the full support (0,1), it
is possible to estimate the whole distribution of MTEs
In which case all population parameters can be derived from
from the MTE
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MTE: recovering ATT
Recovering the ATT requires a little more work.
At each point p, the ATT is the impact of treatment on
participants at such propensity score:
αATT (p) =
∫ p
0
αMTE (v˜) dFv˜ (v˜ |v˜ < p)
=
∫ p
0
αMTE (v˜)
1
p
dv˜
and the overall ATT is
αATT =
∫
1
0
αATT (v˜) fp(p|d = 1)dp
An estimator of the ATT is the empirical counterpart of the
above parameter
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